RnD/infra

Files

znetsixe 4117ec6063 feat(cloud): single-shot deploy.sh + FROST stack + healthchecks

Stage 5 — make the cloud composition spin up in one command and add
the SensorThings (FROST) stack as a fully segregated tenant.

cloud/deploy.sh — idempotent, 7-step bring-up:
  preflight → validate → up + wait → cert state → issue/renew →
  service status → endpoint smoke test. Reissues LE cert only when
  current issuer no longer matches ACME_CA_URI. Move-aside-then-
  restore-on-failure so the bootstrap cert survives a failed certbot.

stacks/frost — new stack, segregated from shared sql/rabbitmq:
  - dedicated postgis container (frost-db)
  - dedicated internal mosquitto bus (frost-mosquitto)
  - frost-http + frost-mqtt on a private frost-internal network,
    joined to cloud-app only for nginx ingress at frost.wbd-rd.nl
  - shared mosquitto stack deleted; rabbitmq remains the only public
    MQTT broker (mqtt.wbd-rd.nl:8883 via stream proxy)

stacks/sql — pg_isready healthcheck so keycloak/gitea/mlflow can gate
on service_healthy via cloud-level depends_on overrides.

stacks/nginx-proxy:
  - nginx-init service generates a self-signed bootstrap cert on
    fresh deploy so nginx starts before certbot has issued a real one
  - frost.wbd-rd.nl vhost (/FROST-Server → frost-http:8080,
    /mqtt → frost-mqtt:9876 WebSocket)

stacks/mlflow — custom Dockerfile (upstream + psycopg2-binary) so the
official image can speak to the shared sql backend.

stacks/jupyterhub — DummyAuthenticator stub gated by
JUPYTERHUB_ADMIN_PASSWORD; TODO comments point at OIDC + DockerSpawner.

stacks/rabbitmq — config/{enabled_plugins,rabbitmq.conf} stubs
(management + mqtt plugins, MQTT auth required).

stacks/portainer — ports unpublished; nginx now the only ingress.

stacks/node-red — pin to 4.1 (the floating "4" tag does not exist).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-21 16:37:58 +02:00

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portainer

Docker container management UI — the "operator console" for cloud and edge.

Access

Portainer ingresses through nginx-proxy: https://portainer.wbd-rd.nl/. No host port is published by default.

For emergency ops (nginx down, etc.), uncomment the ports: block in compose.yml and docker compose up -d portainer to expose :9443 and :8000 directly.

First-run admin

On first visit, Portainer prompts for an admin username and password. Use a long random password; this account is break-glass — your daily login should come via Keycloak OIDC once that gate is wired (see TODO).

Edge-agent topology

Port 8000 accepts reverse tunnels from edge sites running the portainer/agent image. The central cloud Portainer then manages every edge Docker host. Agent-side config lives under sites/<plant>/ once edge stacks are wired up.

Networks

mgmt — Docker management plane
Docker socket: read-only mount; effectively root-equivalent on the host. Front with Keycloak SSO as soon as auth is wired.

Volumes

portainer-data — Portainer DB (users, environments, stacks, settings)

TODO

Keycloak OIDC auth (Portainer CE needs a frontend gate; Business Edition has native OIDC if budget allows)
Edge-agent provisioning workflow per site (agent secret, registration call)
Disable self-signed :9443 access after nginx-proxy goes live (operational hygiene)

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