RnD/EVOLV

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znetsixe d4e72f280e docs: retire repo-mem MCP, migrate skills to .claude/skills, audit fixes

- Delete .mcp.json + .claude/rules/repo-mem.md; drop .repo-mem from .gitignore
- Remove repo-mem / substrate_score / repo_search references from all .md
- Move 15 EVOLV skills from .agents/skills/ to .claude/skills/ so they are
  auto-discovered by the Claude Code harness and invokable via the Skill tool
- Retire .agents/skills/evolv-orchestrator (duplicate of the subagent at
  .claude/agents/evolv-orchestrator.md); orchestrator lives as a subagent only
- Drop OpenAI-format agent yaml metadata from each skill (not needed for CC)
- Update CLAUDE.md, CONTRACTS.md, AGENTS.md to point at the new locations and
  disambiguate skills (.claude/skills/) vs subagents (.claude/agents/)
- Fix CLAUDE.md tick-loop wording (opt-in per-node, not a fixed 1000ms)
- Widen .claude/rules/ paths frontmatter so node-architecture and telemetry
  rules trigger on more relevant files; add frontmatter to flow-layout rule
- Bump CONTRACTS.md review date to 2026-05-19; add step 7 to the contract-
  change workflow (review example flows when topic usage changes)
- Bump nodes/generalFunctions pin (Home.md substrate_score reference removed)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-19 09:30:49 +02:00

2.3 KiB

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name, description

name	description
evolv-ot-it-security	Perform OT/IT security analysis for EVOLV Node-RED automation systems. Use when reviewing admin endpoints, node input handling, configuration exposure, dependency risk, network/data flow boundaries, and secure-by-default behavior for operational technology integrations.

EVOLV OT/IT Security

Mission

Identify and reduce security risk while preserving operational reliability for process automation workloads.

Harness Execution Contract

Model trust boundaries first (admin HTTP, message ingress, external integrations).
Define security invariants before edits:
- secure defaults stay secure unless explicitly approved
- no sensitive leakage in logs/UI/errors
- malformed control inputs are rejected predictably
Support findings with reproducible evidence and concrete remediation steps.

Scope

Node-RED admin endpoints in node entry files
Input validation across msg.topic and payload paths
Exposure of sensitive config/secrets in code, logs, or UI
Dependency and supply-chain concerns in node packages

Security Workflow

Enumerate attack surface:

HTTP admin routes
message ingress topics/payloads
external service interfaces

Validate input sanitization and type checks.
Check least-privilege assumptions and secret handling.
Evaluate failure modes for denial-of-service or unsafe operation.
Recommend pragmatic controls with minimal operational friction.

Control Priorities

Reject malformed or unauthorized control messages.
Avoid leaking credentials, asset identifiers, or internal topology.
Keep defaults safe; require explicit opt-in for risky behavior.
Preserve auditability of critical control actions.

Validation Expectations

Add negative tests for malformed inputs and unauthorized paths.
Confirm error paths are explicit and non-sensitive.
Document residual risk when controls are deferred.

Deliverables

Return:

findings sorted by severity
concrete remediation plan by file
tests added for security regressions
residual risks and compensating controls

Decision interview triggers:

any change that relaxes authentication/authorization checks
exposure of new admin routes or integration interfaces
security control deferrals that require compensating controls

2.3 KiB Raw Blame History